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# ECE 448/548 Cyber-System Security

## VLSI Technology

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# Outline

**1** Fab

**2** Flow

**3** FPGA


**4** ASIC

# Integrated Circuit (IC) Fabrication

# Printed Circuit Board (PCB)




# An Integrated Die and Packaging



# Encapsulated Integrated Circuit




# Integrated Circuit I/O: Pin Grid Array (PGA)







# Silicon Core Connection to Padframe




# Integrated Circuit Wires Connecting Padframe to I/O Pins




# Integrated Circuit Wiring between Padframe & I/O




# Silicon Core Connection to Padframe



## Close-Up View of Padframe to Wires




# IC Fabrication: Masking




# IC Fabrication: Masking

[ exposure process ]




# Advanced CMOS Layers







# Advanced CMOS Layers



# The Layers Defining an IC: Simple Inverter



# The Layers Defining an IC: Simple NAND Gate



# IC Layout Rules

- 1 Minimum width of a wire

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
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- 6 Power supply wire width (reduce ground bounce)
- 7 Minimum gates rise/fall times (reduce overlap power)

# IC Design Flow

# Integrated Circuit Digital Design Process: **Waterfall Model**




# FPGA Design

## Why use FPGAs?

- 1 Short product release time
- 2 Performance is starting to match ASICs
- 3 Allows for inexpensive design changes
- 4 Recovery from design errors is simple re-configuration
- 5 Easily update design or add new functionality
- 6 Can integrate IP functional modules ( $\mu$ P, DSP, etc.)

# FPGA Basic Architecture



# FPGA Types

- 1 **SRAM** (volatile, reprogrammable)
- 2 Antifuse (non-volatile, one-time programmable)
- 3 EPROM (non-volatile, reprogrammable)



# SRAM-Based FPGA

## 1 Advantages:

- 1 Easily reprogrammable
- 2 Requires standard IC processing


## 2 Disadvantages

- 1 Volatile
- 2 Large area
- 3 External configuration from memory or file


## FPGA Main Components: **The Fabric**

- 1 Built-in CLB blocks
- 2 Built-in Block RAM
- 3 DSP block IP
- 4 Processor IP


# FPGA Capabilities




# FPGA Architecture: IOB, CLB, Switch Matrix




# FPGA Architecture: IOB, CLB, Switch Matrix



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
# FPGA Architecture: CLB









## LUT




# FPGA Programmable Switch Matrix



# FPGA Switch Matrix Programming



# FPGA Switch Matrix Programming




# FPGA Design Flow

- 1 Import 3PIP
- 2 Design integration at design house
- 3 Generate HDL code
- 4 Compile code into FPGA bitstream file
- 5 Encode bitstream
- 6 Load coded bitstream in device NVRAM

# FPGA Configuration


- 1 All configuration bits are present in [bitstream](#)
- 2 Bitstream is stored on external nonvolatile memory (NVRAM)
- 3 Configure on power up
- 4 Configure on demand
- 5 Configuration data is stored in PROM or external data source

# FPGA Decrypt & Configuration



Note access via JTAG port


# FPGA Configuration Example



$$f_1 = x_1 x_2$$


$$f_2 = \overline{x_2} x_3$$

$$f = x_1 x_2 + \overline{x_2} x_3$$






# FPGA Configuration Example




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# FPGA Dual-Port Block SRAM Block




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# FPGA Configuration Lifecycle

- 1 Read encoded configuration file from NVRAM
- 2 Decode the configuration file
- 3 Load the file contents into the proper FPGA components

# FPGA Configuration Bitstream Structure [1]



# FPGA Bitstream Security

- 1** Configuration bitstream is stored in external non-volatile memory
- 2** Bitstream is loaded into FPGA on power-up
- 3** Bitstream is a binary description of the FPGA design. Hence difficult to figure out the design

# FPGA Security Attacks

- 1 **Cloning**: replicate bitstream for similar FPGA
- 2 **Overproduction**: Gaining bitstream allows for privately producing more devices
- 3 **Hardware Trojans**: modify bitstream to add a Trojan
- 4 **Side-Channel**: Information leaks during FPGA bitstream decryption exposes the secret key
- 5 **Side-Channel**: Fault injection introduces errors to test system response

## FPGA Security Attacks Continued

- 1** **Replay**: where attacker replaces bitstream with a vulnerable one
- 2** **Reverse Engineering**: Understand functionality and steal IP
- 3** **Spoofing**: Attacker bitstream replaces original one for control of FPGA
- 4** **Tampering**: Altering design to leak information, functionality or DoS
- 5** **Bitstream Interception**: Allows for parsing the design and steal IP and maybe alter design

# FPGA Security Solutions

- 1 Bitstream Authentication:** This implies encrypting bitstream and authenticating source and destination
- 2 Isolate Configuration Process:** dedicated bitstream processing not the regular/vulnerable, data processing
- 3 Using Trusted Platform Module:** to store secret keys and perform authentication
- 4 Watermarks:** unique ID to prevent overproduction, cloning and forgeries
- 5 Bitstream Obfuscation:** to prevent reverse engineering by introducing random circuits and functions




# ASIC Design


# ASIC Design Features

- 1 Based on standard cell design methodologies
- 2 Control placement and routing of modules
- 3 Optimize performance
- 4 Very time consuming
- 5 Error prone


# Standard Cells



# Standard Cells



# What is an Integrated Circuit



- [1] M. Ender, A. Moradi, and C. Paar, “The unpatchable silicon: A full break of the bitstream encryption of xilinx 7-series FPGAs,” in *USENIX Security Symposium*, 2020, pp. 1803–1891.