

# Course Name

Title: Cyber System Security

**RSA & ECC vs. SCA**

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# Outline

- 1 Fields
- 2  $GF(p)$
- 3  $GF(2^m)$
- 4 RSA
- 5 RtL
- 6 LtR
- 7 NAF
- 8 RtL NAF
- 9 LtR NAF
- 10 ECC
- 11 ECC Cryptography
- 12 Scalar
- 13 ECC Add
- 14 ECC Double

# Finite Fields

# Finite Field

- 1 A set of  $p$  elements (integers) and represented by  $GF(p)$  or  $\mathbb{F}_p$
- 2 Sometimes called Galois Field
- 3 For any prime  $p$  and positive integer  $m$ , an extension field could be defined. The prime  $p$  is called the **characteristic** of the finite extension field  $GF(p^m)$  or  $\mathbb{F}_{p^m}$
- 4 **Binary extension field** when  $p = 2$ :  $GF(2^m)$  or  $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$
- 5 **Prime field** when  $m = 1$ :  $GF(p)$  or  $\mathbb{F}_p$

# Types of Fields

- 1  $\mathbb{R}$ : field of real numbers
- 2  $\mathbb{C}$ : field of complex numbers
- 3  $\mathbb{Z}$ : field of integer numbers
- 4  $\mathbb{Q}$ : field of rational numbers
- 5  $\mathbb{F}_p$ : field of exactly  $p$  elements

# Finite Field Properties

- 1  $F$  must have the elements 0 and 1.
- 2  $F$  has additive **identity element** 0.
- 3  $F$  has **multiplicative identity element** 1.
- 4 **Closure**: for  $a, b \in F$ ,  $a + b \in F$  and  $ab \in F$ .
- 5  $F$  follows **distributive law**:

$$a(b + c) = ab + ac$$

- 6 Division  $a/b$ : This implies finding  $q$  &  $r$  such that  $a = qb + r$
- 7 **Multiplicative inverse**:  $ab \pmod p \equiv a(a^{-1}) \pmod p \equiv 1$

## Characteristic of $F$

**Characteristic**  $p$  of a field  $F$  is the smallest prime integer such that:

$$\underbrace{1 + 1 + \dots + 1}_{p \text{ times}} = 0$$

where 1 is the multiplicative identity and 0 is the additive identity of the field  $F$ . Of course the addition operations are all done modulo  $p$ .

# Prime Field $GF(p)$ or $\mathbb{F}_p$

## Prime Field $GF(p)$ or $\mathbb{F}_p$

- 1  $GF(p)$  is based on a prime number  $p$  and contains the integers  $0, 1, 2, \dots, p - 1$ .
- 2 Main problem with arithmetic in  $GF(p)$  is carry propagation especially when  $p$  is a large number with hundreds of decimal places.

# Fermat's Little Theorem for $GF(p)$

## Theorem

**Fermat's Little Theorem (FLT)** Given  $a \in GF(p)$  we can write:

$$a^{p-1} \bmod p \equiv 1 \quad \text{or} \quad a^p \bmod p \equiv a$$

As a consequence, we have

**1**  $a^{p-2} \bmod p = a^{-1}$

**2**  $a^i \bmod p = (a^{i \bmod p-1}) \bmod p$

## FLT Example

### Example

Use FLT to estimate

$$x = 3^{3002} \pmod{5}$$

First we do modulo on exponent where mod is  $p - 1 = 4$ :

$$3002 \pmod{4} \equiv 2$$

Therefore

$$\begin{aligned} 3^{3002} \pmod{5} &= 3^{(3002 \pmod{4})} \pmod{5} \\ &= 3^2 \pmod{5} \\ &= 9 \pmod{5} = 4 \end{aligned}$$

# NIST Generalized Mersenne Primes

$$1 \quad p_{192} : 2^{192} - 2^{64} - 1$$

$$2 \quad p_{224} : 2^{224} - 2^{96} + 1$$

$$3 \quad p_{256} : 2^{256} - 2^{224} + 2^{219} + 2^{95} - 1$$

$$4 \quad p_{384} : 2^{384} - 2^{128} - 2^{96} + 2^{32} - 1$$

$$5 \quad p_{521} : 2^{521} - 1$$

# Binary Extension Field $GF(2^m)$ or $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$

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$$Q(x) = \sum_{i=0}^m q_i x^i$$

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$$Q(x) = \sum_{i=0}^m q_i x^i$$

- 3 Elements in the field are polynomials having  $m$  coefficients.
- 4 An element  $A(x) \in GF(2^m)$  is represented as an  $m$ -term polynomial:

$$A(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} a_i x^i$$

where  $a_i \in GF(2)$ . The maximum degree of  $A$  is  $m - 1$

## Binary Field Irreducible (Generating) Polynomial $Q(x)$

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- 1  $GF(2^m)$  is defined based on an irreducible polynomial  $Q(x)$  of degree  $m$
- 2 We can write  $Q(x)$  in the form:

$$Q(x) = x^m + \sum_{i=1}^{m-1} q_i x^i + 1$$

where  $q_i \in GF(2)$ .

# Elements in $GF(2^3)$

An element  $p(x) \in GF(2^3)$  can be written as:

$$p(x) = \alpha x^2 + \beta x + \gamma$$

$\alpha$	$\beta$	$\gamma$	
0	0	0	0
0	0	1	1
0	1	0	$x$
0	1	1	$x + 1$
1	0	0	$x^2$
1	0	1	$x^2 + 1$
1	1	0	$x^2 + x$
1	1	1	$x^2 + x + 1$

# Fermat's Little Theorem for $GF(2^m)$

## Theorem

**Fermat's Little Theorem (FLT)** Given  $p(x) \in GF(2^m)$  we can write:

$$p(x)^{2^m} \bmod Q(x) = p(x)$$

As a consequence, we have

$$1 \quad p(x)^{2^m-1} \bmod Q(x) = 1$$

$$2 \quad p(x)^{2^m-2} \bmod Q(x) = p(x)^{-1}$$

$$3 \quad p(x)^i \bmod Q(x) = p(x)^{i \bmod 2^m-1} \bmod Q(x)$$

## NIST $GF(2^m)$ Irreducible Polynomials

1  $F = x^{163} + x^7 + x^6 + x^3 + 1$  (pentanomial)

2  $F = x^{233} + x^{74} + 1$  (trinomial)

3  $F = x^{283} + x^{12} + x^7 + x^5 + 1$  (pentanomial)

4  $F = x^{409} + x^{87} + 1$  (trinomial)

5  $F = x^{571} + x^{10} + x^5 + x^2 + 1$  (pentanomial)

# Rivest Shamir Adelman Algorithm

# Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Cryptosystem Basic Principle

$$M^{k_s k_p} \pmod n \equiv 1, \quad C \equiv M^{k_p} \pmod n, \quad M \equiv C^{k_s} \pmod n$$

- 1 Select different primes  $p, q$  and calculate Euler's totient:


$$n = p \times q \quad \text{and} \quad \lambda(n) = \text{lcm}(p - 1, q - 1)$$

- 2 Select integer  $2 < k_p < \lambda(n)$  such that  $\text{gcd}(k_p, \lambda(n)) \equiv 1$ .  
Usually  $k_p = 2^{16} + 1$ .

- 3 find  $k_s = k_p^{-1} \pmod{\lambda(n)}$  or  $k_s k_p \pmod{\lambda(n)} = 1$


- 4  $k_s$  is found using extended Euclidean algorithm or Fermat little theorem (FLT)

# Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA): Data Privacy




**Data privacy:** Only recipient can read the message

# Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA): Digital Signature



**Digital Signature:** Only sender could have generated document

# Modular Exponentiation: Finding $A^{21}$ Using Right-to-Left



# Exponentiation Rules

$$1 \quad a^n = \underbrace{a \times a \times \cdots \times a}_{n \text{ terms}}$$

$$2 \quad a^{b+c} = a^b \times a^c$$

$$3 \quad a^{b \times c} = (a^b)^c$$

$$4 \quad a^n \times b^n = (a \times b)^n$$

# Expressing Exponentiation in Binary

- 1 Assume a number  $A$  and its exponent  $X$
- 2 Number of bits needed to represent  $X$  is  $n = \lceil \log_2 X \rceil$
- 3 We can write

$$a^X = a^{x_{n-1}2^{n-1} + x_{n-2}2^{n-2} + \dots + x_12^1 + x_02^0}$$

with  $x_i \in \{0, 1\}$  for  $0 \leq i < n$

# Modular Exponentiation: Finding $A^X$ Using Right-to-Left

# Modular Exponentiation: Binary Representation

1 We have binary representation of exponent:

$$b = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} b_i 2^i = \sum_{b_i \neq 0} 2^i$$


2 We have

$$A^X = \left[ \prod_{x_i \neq 0} A^{2^i} \right] \pmod{p}$$

3 We can distribute modulo inside the products:

$$A^X = \prod_{x_i \neq 0} \left[ A^{2^i} \pmod{p} \right] \pmod{p}$$

# Modular Exponentiation: Finding $A^{21}$ Using Right-to-Left



## Restrictions on $C = A^X \pmod p$

We can write

$$C = A^X \pmod p = \left[ A^{X \pmod{p-1}} \right] \pmod p$$

We must ensure two bounds on  $A$  and  $X$ :

**1** Bound on  $A$

$$0 \leq A < p$$

**2** Bound on  $X$  based on FLT

$$0 \leq X < p - 1$$

## Modular Exponentiation $C = A^X \pmod p$ Using Right-to-Left: right-to-left (RtL) or LSB-to-MSB algorithm

**Input:** message  $A$ , secret key  $X$ , modulus  $p$ , and # bits  $B$

**if**  $x(0) = 1$  **then**

  |  $C = A$ ;

**else**

  |  $C = 1$ ;

**end**

**for**  $b = 1 : B - 1$  **do**

  |  $A = A \times A \pmod p$ ;

    % unconditional square for next iteration

**if**  $x_b = 1$  **then**

    |  $C = C \times A \pmod p$ ;

      % conditional multiply

**else**

    |  $C = C$ ;

**end**

**end**

Rtl algorithm example: **Case  $C = A^{13} \pmod{17}$  Using Right-to-Left**

	$\leftarrow$	$\leftarrow$	$\leftarrow$	$\leftarrow$	$\leftarrow$
Bit index ( $b$ )	4	3	2	1	0
$2^b$	16	8	4	2	1
$X_b$	0	1	1	0	1
$A$	$A^{16}$	$A^8$	$A^4$	$A^2$	$A$
$C$	$A^{13}$	$A^{13}$	$A^5$	$A$	$A$


Rtl algorithm example:  $C = 6^{13} \pmod{17}$  Using Right-to-Left

	←	←	←	←
Bit index ( $b$ )	3	2	1	0
$2^b$	8	4	2	1
$x$	1	1	0	1
$A$	16	4	2	6
$C$	10	7	6	6

$$C = 6^{13} \pmod{17} = 10$$

# Modular Exponentiation: Finding $A^X$ Using Left-to-Right

# Modular Exponentiation: Finding $A^{21}$ Using Left-to-Right



## Modular Exponentiation $C = A^X \pmod n$ : left-to-right (LtR) algorithm or MSB-to-LSB

```
1: if  $x_{B-1} = 1$  then
2:    $C = A$ 
3: else
4:    $C = 1$ 
5: end if
6: for  $b = B - 2 : 0$  do
7:    $C = C \times C \pmod p$ 
8:   if  $x_b = 1$  then
9:      $C = C \times A \pmod p$ 
10:  end if
11: end for
12: return  $C$ 
```

Unconditional square  $C$  then conditional multiply by  $A$

# LtR algorithm example: Case $X = 29$

	→	→	→	→	→
Bit index ( $b$ )	4	3	2	1	0
$2^b$	16	8	4	2	1
$X_b$	1	1	1	0	1
$C$	A	$A^3$	$A^7$	$A^{14}$	$A^{29}$

# LtR algorithm example: $C = 5^{27} \pmod{7}$

	→	→	→	→	→
Bit index ( $b$ )	4	3	2	1	0
$2^b$	16	8	4	2	1
$X_b$	1	1	0	1	1
$C$	5	6	1	5	6

# Non-Adjacent Form (NAF)

## NAF

Hopefully speeds up algorithm.

6-bit Binary number            0   1   1   1   0   1

7-bit NAF Representation    0   1   0   0   -1   0   1

Must add one extra bit on left:  $B \rightarrow B + 1$

# Right-to-Left NAF for Modular Exponentiation

Rtl NAF Modular Exponentiation  $C = A^X \pmod p$ : right-to-left (Rtl)

```

1:  $C = 1, A_1 = A, A_2 = A^{-1}$ 
2: for  $i = 0 : B - 1$  do
3:    $A_1 = A_1^2 \pmod p, \quad A_2 = A_2^2 \pmod p$ 
4:   if  $x_i = 1$  then
5:      $C = C \times A_1 \pmod p$ 
6:   else if  $x_i = -1$  then
7:      $C = C \times A_2 \pmod p$ 
8:   end if
9: end for
10: return  $C$ 

```

Need to find multiplicative inverse  $A_2$

# NAF Modular Exponentiation $C = A^X \pmod n$ : right-to-left Example when $X = 13$

		←	←	←	←	←
$X_{NAF}$	1	0	-1	0	1	
$A_1$	$A^{16}$	$A^8$	$A^4$	$A^2$	$A$	
$A_2$	$A^{-16}$	$A^{-8}$	$A^{-4}$	$A^{-2}$	$A^{-1}$	
$C$	$A^{13}$	$A^{-3}$	$A^{-3}$	$A$	$A$	

NAF RtL: Case  $C = 8^{27} \pmod{31}$ 

	←	←	←	←	←	←
Bit index ( $b$ )	5	4	3	2	1	0
$2^b$	32	16	8	4	2	1
$X_{bin}$	0	1	1	0	1	1
$X_{NAF}$	1	0	0	-1	0	-1
$A_1$	2	8	16	4	2	8
$A_2$	16	4	2	8	16	4
$C$	2	1	1	1	4	4

# Left-to-Right NAF for Modular Exponentiation

# LtR NAF Modular Exponentiation $C = A^X \pmod n$ : Left-to-Right

**Require:**  $A, n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ ,  $X = (x_{B-1}, \dots, x_1, x_0)_{NAF}$

1:  $A_1 = A, A_2 = A^{-1}, C = 1$

2: **if**  $x_{B-1} = 1$  **then**

3:  $C = A_1$

4: **else if**  $x_{B-1} = -1$  **then**

5:  $C = A_2$

6: **end if**

7: **for**  $i = n - 2 : 0$  **do**

8:  $C = C^2 \pmod p$

9: **if**  $x_i = 1$  **then**

10:  $C = C \times A_1 \pmod p$

11: **else if**  $x_i = -1$  **then**

12:  $C = C \times A_2 \pmod p$

13: **end if**

14: **end for**

# NAF Modular Exponentiation: Left-to-Right Example $C = A^{25}$

Note we need here to increase the number of bits from 5 to 6:

	→	→	→	→	→	→
$b$	5	4	3	2	1	0
$2^b$	32	16	8	4	2	1
$x_{NAF}$	1	0	-1	0	0	1
$C$	$A$	$A^2$	$A^3$	$A^6$	$A^{12}$	$A^{25}$

# NAF Rtl Modular Exponentiation: Case $C = 12^6 \pmod{17}$

We have  $A_1 = 12$  and  $A_2 = 10$ .


	→	→	→	→
Bit index ( $b$ )	3	2	1	0
$2^b$	8	4	2	1
$x_{NAF}$	1	0	-1	0
$C$	12	8	11	2

# Elliptic Curve Cryptography


# Motivation

- 1 ECC, as PKI, offers higher level of security for same number of secret key bits compared to RSA
- 2 Energy to break RSA enough to boil spoonful of water. Energy to break ECC needs to boil all water on earth.
- 3 ECC is suited to embedded and IoT devices with limited resources
- 4 Pairing ECC offers immunity to quantum attacks



# Elliptic Curve Equation Physical Origins




# ECC Graphic Representation



# Elliptic Curves



# Elliptic Curves



# Elliptic Curves

- 1 Elliptic curves of interest are a group of points over  $GF(p)$  or  $GF(2^m)$
- 2 An extra point is  $\mathcal{O}$  the point at infinity so that all vertical lines pass through it
- 3 A point on the elliptic curve is  $P = (x, y)$
- 4 Inverse of a point:  $-P = (x, -y)$
- 5  $y^2 = Poly(x)$  where  $Poly(x)$  is a polynomial of degree 3 with no repeated roots

# Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem

- 1 Given Points  $P, Q \in E_p(a, b)$  and integer  $k$
- 2 Do scalar multiplication  $Q = k \times P$ :

$$Q = \underbrace{P + P + \dots + P}_{k\text{-terms}}$$

- 3 Publish  $P$  and  $Q$
- 4 Very difficult to figure out the secret value  $k$

# ECC Discrete Logarithm Problem

1 Given  $E_p(a, b)$  over  $GF(p)$

$$P_2 = kP_1$$

2 It is difficult to find integer  $k$  given  $P_1$  and  $P_2$

# ECC Cryptography

# Basic ECC Cryptography Steps

**1** Secret key generation

**2** Data Encryption

**3** Data Decryption

## ECC: Secret Key Generation

- 1 Pick a curve  $E_p(a, b)$
- 2 Choose a random number as secret key  $0 < k_s < p$
- 3 Choose a generator point  $P_1$
- 4 Do scalar multiplication

$$P_2 = k_s P_1$$

- 5 Scalar multiplication gives the public key

$$k_p = P_2 = k_s P_1$$

## ECC: Encryption

- 1 Choose message to send  $M$ , a string of bits
- 2 Map  $M$  to a point  $m$  on the curve  $E_p(a, b)$
- 3 Generate a random number  $d$  to get

$$C_1 = dP_1 \quad \text{and} \quad C_2 = m + dP_2$$

- 4 Send the two points  $C_1$  and  $C_2$
- 5 Publish public key  $k_p = P_2$

## ECC: Decryption

1 We get the point  $m$  as

$$m = C_2 - k_s C_1$$

2 We can write

$$\begin{aligned} m &= m + dP_2 - k_s dP_1 \\ &= m + dk_s P_1 - k_s dP_1 \end{aligned}$$

3 Thus we recovered  $m$

4 Do inverse mapping to get  $M$

## Key Length for ECC Security

	Security Level (bits)				
	80	112	128	192	256
	SKIPJACK	3DES	AES-S	AES-M	AES-L
EC $GF(p)$	192	224	256	384	521
EC $GF(2^m)$	163	233	283	409	571
RSA	1,024	2,048	3,072	8,192	15,360



# NIST Standard Elliptic Curve Primes for $GF(p)$

$$p_{192} = 2^{192} - 2^{64} - 1$$

$$p_{224} = 2^{224} - 2^{96} + 1$$

$$p_{256} = 2^{256} - 2^{224} + 2^{192} + 2^{96} - 1$$

$$p_{384} = 2^{384} - 2^{128} - 2^{96} + 2^{32} - 1$$

$$p_{521} = 2^{521} - 1$$

## Quasi Mersenne Integers

## Non NIST Curves [3]: M (montgomery)

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax^2 + x \pmod{p} \quad \text{plus} \quad O$$

$$p_{221} = 2^{221} - 3, \quad a = 117,050$$

$$p_{255} = 2^{255} - 19, \quad a = 486,662$$

$$p_{383} = 2^{383} - 187, \quad a = 2,065,150$$

$$p_{511} = 2^{511} - 187, \quad a = 530,438$$

## Example

max: 1157920892103562487626974469494075735300861  
43415290 314195533631308867097853951

curve:  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$

a = 11579208921035624876269744694940757353008614  
34152903 14195533631308867097853948

b = 41058363725152142129326129780047268409114441  
015993 725554835256314039467401291

## ECC Defining Equation for $GF(2^m)$

- 1 Weierstrass equation [1, 2]:

$$y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b \quad \text{plus} \quad \mathcal{O}$$

where  $x$ ,  $y$ ,  $a$  and  $b$  are elements in  $GF(2^m)$ . For cryptographic purposes the value of  $m$  takes values  $m > 160$ .

- 2 Binary extension field  $GF(2^m)$  does not require carry
- 3 Addition is same as subtraction

## Example of $E \in GF(2^4)$

$$y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + 1 \quad a \in GF(2^m) \quad \text{plus} \quad \mathcal{O}$$

# NIST Standard Elliptic Curve Polynomials for $GF(2^m)$

$$f_{163}(x) = x^{163} + x^7 + x^3 + 1$$

$$f_{233}(x) = x^{233} + x^{74} + 1$$

$$f_{283}(x) = x^{283} + x^{12} + x^7 + x^5 + 1$$

$$f_{409}(x) = x^{409} + x^{87} + 1$$

$$f_{571}(x) = x^{571} + x^{10} + x^5 + x^2 + 1$$

## Elliptic Curve Example $E$ over $GF(23)$

Elliptic curve  $E$  over  $GF(23)$  satisfying the equation:

$$y^2 = x^3 + x \quad (1)$$

- 1** We have  $a = 1$  and  $b = 0$ . It can be easily verified that the point  $(0,0)$  lies on the curve.
- 2** The point  $(9,5)$  also lies on the curve. The left hand side is:

$$y^2 = 25 \pmod{23} \equiv 2$$

- 3** The right hand side produces:

$$x^3 + x = 729 + 9 \equiv 2$$

# NIST Standard Elliptic Curve Polynomials for $GF(2^m)$

$$f_{163}(x) = x^{163} + x^7 + x^3 + 1$$


$$f_{233}(x) = x^{233} + x^{74} + 1$$

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$$f_{571}(x) = x^{571} + x^{10} + x^5 + x^2 + 1$$

# ECC Hierarchy



# Elliptic Curve Cryptography

## Scalar Multiplication

## Elliptic Curve Cryptography: **Scalar Multiplication**

$$Q = kP, \quad Q, P \in E, \quad k \in \mathbb{Z}$$

- 1 This is the discrete logarithm problem
- 2 System relies on security of elliptic curve encryption
- 3 Given  $P$  and  $Q$ , it is very difficult to find  $k$

## ECC Scalar Multiplication $Q = kP$ : Point Double & Add

ECC point doubling at iteration  $i$ :

$$\begin{aligned}kP \rightarrow 2^i P &= 2^{i-1} P + 2^{i-1} P \\ &= 2 \times 2^{i-1} P\end{aligned}$$

i.e. simple [point doubling](#) of previous result

## ECC Scalar Multiplication: $Q = kP$ : right-to-left (RtL) or LSB to MSB algorithm

**Require:**  $P$  and  $k = (k_{m-1}, k_{m-2}, \dots, k_0)$

1:  $A = P$ ;  $Q = \mathcal{O}$

2: **for**  $i = 0 : m - 1$  **do**

3:   **if**  $k_i = 1$  **then**

4:      $Q = Q + A$  (Conditional point add)

5:   **end if**

6:    $A = 2A$  (Unconditional point double for next iteration)

7: **end for**

8: **RETURN**  $Q$

Point Doubling Rtl Example: Case  $k = 13$ 

	←	←	←	←	←
Bit weight ( $i$ )	4	3	2	1	0
$2^i$	16	8	4	2	1
$k_j$	0	1	1	0	1
$A$	$16P$	$8P$	$4P$	$2P$	$P$
$Q$	$13P$	$13P$	$5P$	$P$	$P$

## Scalar Multiplication $Q = kP$ : left-to-right (LtR) algorithm or MSB to LSB

**Require:**  $P$  and  $k = (k_{m-1}, k_{m-2}, \dots, k_0)$

1:  $Q = P$

2: **for**  $i = m - 2 : 0$  **do**

3:    $Q = 2Q$  (Point double)

4:   **if**  $k_i = 1$  **then**

5:      $Q = Q + P$  (Point add & double)

6:   **else**

7:      $Q = Q$  (Point double)

8:   **end if**

9: **end for**


Unconditional double  $Q$  then conditional add  $P$

# LtR algorithm example: Case $k = 29$

	→	→	→	→	→
Bit weight ( $i$ )	4	3	2	1	0
$2^i$	16	8	4	2	1
$k_i$	1	1	1	0	1
$Q$	$P$	$3P$	$7P$	$14P$	$29P$

# ECC Add

# ECC Add Operation: $P_3 = P_1 + P_2$



The addition operation is written as:

$$P_3 = P_1 + P_2$$

## ECC Add Operation: $P_3 = P_1 + P_2$

**1** Assume  $P_1 = (x_1, y_1)$ ,  $P_2 = (x_2, y_2)$ ,  $P_3 = (x_3, y_3)$

**2**

$$x_3 = m^2 - x_1 - x_2 \pmod{p}$$

$$y_3 = m(x_1 - x_3) - y_1 \pmod{p}$$

where

$$m = \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} \pmod{p}$$

$m$  is the slope of the line connecting points  $P$  and  $Q$ .

## ECC Add Operation: $P_3 = P_1 + P_2$


Point addition in ECC arithmetic requires the following basic finite field operations:

- 1 Field additions/subtractions
- 2 Field multiplications
- 3 Finding inverse of an element
- 4 Modular exponentiation

It is up to the system designer to implement these operations in hardware or software depending on the capabilities of the field arithmetic unit (FAU) being designed.

# ECC Double

# ECC Double



## ECC Point Doubling Operation: $P_3 = 2P_1$

**1** Assume  $P_1 = (x_1, y_1)$  and  $P_3 = (x_3, y_3)$ ,

**2**

$$m = \frac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1} \pmod{p}$$

**3**

$$x_3 = m^2 - 2x_1 \pmod{p}$$

$$y_3 = m(x_1 - x_3) - y_1 \pmod{p}$$

# Elliptic Curve Calculators

- 1** To do point addition and multiplication in  $\mathbb{R}$  and  $\mathbb{F}_p$   
<https://andrea.corbellini.name/ecc/interactive/reals-add.html>
- 2** Elliptic Curves over  $\mathbb{F}_1$  showing point additions  
<https://grau.de/code/elliptic2/>
- 3** Plot elliptic curve points in  $\mathbb{F}_p$   
[https://asecuritysite.com/encryption/ecc\\_pointsv?a0=0&a1=7&a2=802283](https://asecuritysite.com/encryption/ecc_pointsv?a0=0&a1=7&a2=802283)

- [1] D. Hankerson, A. Menezes, and S. Vanstone, *Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography*. New York: Springer, 2004.
- [2] IEEE P1363.2 working group, “Standard for identity-based public-key cryptography using pairings,” *IEEE*, 2010.
- [3] D. F. Aranha, P. S. L. M. Barreto, G. C. C. F. Pereira, and J. E. Ricardini, “A note on high-security general-purpose elliptic curves,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2013/647, 2013, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/647>.